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, TRINQUIER AND GALULA
FRENCH COUNTERINSURGENCY THEORIES IN THE ALGERIAN WAR
AND THEIR APPLICATION TO MODERN CONFLICTS

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Executive Summary

Title: Trinquier and Galula: French Counterinsurgency Theories in the Algerian War.

Author: Charles F. Waterfall, Special Agent, Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Thesis: An examination of counterinsurgency methods used by the French in the Algerian War can lead to a better understanding of today's insurgencies.

Discussion: From 1954 to 1962, France fought a bitter and brutal counterinsurgency war in Algeria. In the wake of defeat in Indochina (Vietnam), France was determined not to lose in Algeria. Unlike its other overseas territories, Algeria was regarded as being part of France proper and not simply as a colony. Roger Trinquier and David Galula served as officers in the French Army and were posted to Algeria during the conflict known in France as the Algerian War. Both officers documented their first hand observations and actions in their attempts to counter the insurgents. Examinations of their works shed light on today's insurgencies.

Conclusion: In an insurgency, where the smallest actions can resonate with the greatest consequences, a tactical victory may lead to strategic defeat while a seemingly unimportant gesture may produce support and loyalty. In such a situation, it is imperative that all those involved, from the head of government to the private in the military, understand both the mission and the long term ramifications of every action taken. The resources of a country must be properly and effectively brought to bear in a well thought out and methodical process in order to conduct a successful counterinsurgency. A country's greatest asset in this form of warfare is the effective small unit leader whose local operations have global ramifications.

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Preface

It is my hope that this work may lead to further discussion and study regarding previous attempts at counterinsurgency and how they may or may not be applicable or adaptable to modern conflicts.

I would like to thank Dad showing me by example from my youngest age that there is no compromise in the face of evil; Mom for teaching me that it is the duty of those who are stronger to protect the weak even if those who would do harm are more powerful than the protector, and to my brother, my best friend, who has lived a life of kindness and virtue and been the person whom I should strive to be.

I would like to thank all keepers of the peace who have given the ultimate sacrifice in the effort that the evil we face today will not be allowed to prey upon future generations. To Mark Whitford, thank you. On September 11, 2001, you gave your life so that others might live. Stand ready in the night.

INTRODUCTION

From 1954 to 1962, France fought a bitter and brutal counterinsurgency war in Algeria. In the wake of defeat in Indochina (Vietnam), France was determined not to lose in Algeria. Unlike its other overseas territories, Algeria was regarded as being part of France proper and not simply as a colony. Roger Trinquier and David Galula served as officers in the French Army and were posted to Algeria during the conflict known in France as the Algerian War. Both officers documented their first hand observations and actions in their attempts to counter the insurgents. Examinations of their works shed light on today's insurgencies.

ROGER TRINQUIER ON COUNTERINSURGENCY (COIN)

Trinquier

Background. Roger Trinquier (1908-1986) was a 1931 graduate of the Officer's School of Saint Maixent. He then entered armed service with the "Colonials" who were specially trained for overseas operations. In 1961 they were once again given their pre-1870 title of the French Marine Infantry. Trinquier was first assigned to China with the mission of combating opium smugglers and pirates in some of the most remote and wildest areas of the region. After returning to France, he was assigned, in 1937, to Shanghai. During World War II, Trinquier, along with most of the French forces in the area, remained part of the Vichy French forces. Many of these soldiers rationalized that to side with the resistance would be to violate their oaths of service.(1)

COIN Experience. Beginning in 1946, Trinquier served several tours in Indochina (Vietnam). As a major, he studied Vietminh guerrilla tactics and then

specialized in operations behind enemy lines. Trinquier's unit reached an approximate size of 20,000 men operating over thousands of square miles of enemy territory by 1953. The unit was so popular among local tribesmen that training and equipping could not keep pace with recruitment. The French defeat at Dien Bien Phu disturbed Trinquier and other French officers who saw thousands of loyal indigenous troops left to the mercy of the communists.(2) In 1957, Lieutenant Trinquier was deployed to Algiers as part of General Massu's 10th Parachute Division which was given the responsibility of restoring order after it was apparent that the civil authorities were powerless to stop the increasing levels of terrorist violence.(3)

Character of War in Algeria

Sections. In Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency, written in 1964, Trinquier divided his discussion of counterinsurgency into three sections: preparation for war, the political and military conduct of the war, and carrying the war to the enemy. In preparation for warfare, Trinquier stated that the military establishment insisted upon the continued study of conventional warfare despite the fact that France continued to lose its overseas empire as a result of low intensity or unconventional conflicts. The French military had no chance of defeating an enemy who employed a strategy and armaments that the conventional establishment refused to study or to otherwise address.(4)

Multidisciplinary Approach. This new form of engagement being employed by the enemy was termed modern warfare. Trinquier went on to describe this modern warfare. "Warfare is now an interlocking system of actions – political, economic, psychological, military – that aims at the overthrow of the established authority in a

country and its replacement by another regime. To achieve this end, the aggressor tries to

exploit the internal tensions of the country attacked – ideological, social, religious,

economic – any conflict liable to have a profound influence on the population to be

conquered. Moreover, in view of the present-day interdependence of nations, any

residual grievance within a population, no matter how localized and lacking in scope, will

surely be brought by determined adversaries into the framework of the great world

conflict. From a localized conflict of secondary origin and importance, they will always

attempt sooner or later to bring about a generalized conflict."(5)

Situational Recognition. It is first imperative to understand that the enemy does

not consist of isolated criminal elements, small violent groups, but a large "armed

clandestine organization whose essential role is to impose its will upon the

population."(6)

Terrorism. The primary weapon of modern warfare employed by the insurgents is

terrorism. This requires very limited resources. "The goal of modern warfare is control

of the populous, and terrorism is a particularly appropriate weapon, since it aims directly

at the inhabitant. In the street, at work, at home, the citizen lives continually under the

threat of violent death. In the presence of this permanent danger surrounding him, he has

the depressing feeling of being an isolated and defenseless target. The fact that public

authority and the police are no longer capable of ensuring his security adds to his distress.

He loses confidence in the state whose inherent mission it is to guarantee his safety. He

is more and more drawn to the side of the terrorists, who alone are able to protect

him."(7)

Insurgent Structure. In the city of Algiers, the insurgents operated the Autonomous Zone of Algiers (Z.A.A.) This zone was autonomous but was connected to the insurgent structure across Algeria. The Z.A.A. had two distinct faces which were distinctly separate below zone level, the political side, the National Liberation Front (F.L.N.) and the military wing, the National Liberation Army (A.L.N.). The zone had four council members, each specializing in a particular area: "a political-military leader, a political assistant, a military assistant, and an assistant for external liaison and intelligence."(8)

The assistant for external assistance and intelligence had several specialist committees of the F.L.N. at his disposal. These consisted of the organization's intellectuals and included the following committees: liaison, information, editorial, justice, financial, health, and trade union. The zone council also maintained a section which was highly secret and compartmented and which reported directly to the council; this was the bomb throwing network.(9)

Insurgent Recruitment. The upper level cadres had joined the organization by their own choice. They were trained Marxists. The lower levels of the organization tended to be career criminals and other elements from the rougher side of society. This made them particularly adept at using violence, intimidation, extortion, and other methods and at eluding the authorities. The F.L.N. was very effective at extorting taxes from the population. These efforts naturally fed into the A.L.N.'s heavy handed recruiting efforts. This heavy handedness also put pressure on the general population to support the A.L.N. and particularly not to support the French.(10)

Legal System. The terrorist is able not only to operate in secrecy but also to manipulate the very legal system which is charged with stopping him. Traditional reactive law enforcement proves unable to address the threat. In 1956, not one single terrorist was arrested in Algiers.(11)

Countering the Insurgency

General Counterinsurgency

Viewpoint. Trinquier offered a grand view of the counterinsurgency effort. He felt that the counterinsurgency effort could be won through the concerted and coordinated use of national level means.(12) The war could be won if the government recognized what it possessed which the insurgents did not, particularly manpower and other resources, and if the government could effectively harness these resources.(13) It has been declared that the only way to fight an insurgent is to use his own tactics against him. A government may, however, be unable for a variety of reasons to employ these same tactics. Also, the government will then ignore the tools which it has at its disposal which the insurgents do not.(14)

Identification of Adversaries. It is necessary to identify just who is one's adversary.(15) Prior to violent actions being perpetrated by the insurgents, there is usually some sort of political front organization present. Through this, the insurgents will attempt to maintain the image of their desires for peace. The counterinsurgent forces must declare open war against the terrorists in order to outlaw any support for the insurgents. This will identify these front organizations as their supporters and therefore enemy elements.(16)

Propaganda. Trinquier also states that there must be a high level of support for military counterinsurgency operations. This requires an intensive propaganda effort and the suppression of any opposing propaganda that may be detrimental to the morale of and the support for the military. (17)

Objective - Population. Since the primary objective in modern warfare is control of the populace, the territory must be defended. First, the population must be able to defend itself. Second, an apparatus must be developed to detect enemy presence and activity with the territory in preparation for hostilities. Third, in the event of hostilities and of enemy control over a large portion of the population, special wartime methods must be utilized which would not have even been considered during peacetime.(18)

Self Defense. The objective may be the population, but the center of the conflict is the individual located within his own home.(19) While the goal of the terrorist is to isolate the individual, the goal of the authorities is to ensure that that the individual is not alone and is able to participate in his own defense. In order for the counterinsurgent forces to begin this process, a capable and trusted local along with several competent assistants must be installed by the counterinsurgents at the city level. He will be tasked with building the self-defense apparatus. Members must be carefully investigated and vetted in order to avoid abuses, enemy infiltration, and other problems.(20)

Census. When conditions are more difficult where loyalties may be doubtful, more complex measures should be enacted. The organization must be built from the bottom up. This is a situation best addressed by paramilitary law enforcement entities of the counterinsurgent forces. A census must be meticulously taken of the entire population. During this step, the head of the family will be charged with the

responsibility for everyone who lives in the home and with the maintenance of an up to date list for the census.(21)

Urban COIN Structure. An individual responsible for a group of homes, the floor of a building, or an apartment complex will be designated as chief of that house group. Upon the completion of the census, chiefs of sub-districts will be appointed. The chief of a sub-district will be over approximately ten chiefs of house groups. This individual must have close ties to the area such as an affluent business and a large family. This will make it more difficult for him to desert this position. This mechanism will allow for information from the government to be passed to the population and for the collection of intelligence. This will also aid the government in enlisting the population's participation in self-defense efforts.(22)

Indigenous Intelligence. An intelligence network must be emplaced in order to detect the enemy. The aforementioned organization will service as an information collection method. A more highly trained indigenous intelligence apparatus must be developed by the counterinsurgency forces. Training centers must be developed with these individuals then being planted into workplaces, pubic services, social spots, etc. A direct action arm must also be developed. They will be highly trained and capable of detecting, tracking, and apprehending enemy agents. Some of the most effective members of this section will be turned terrorists. Once they have sold out their follow insurgents during interrogations, they will be unable to return to enemy ranks.(23)

This indigenous intelligence apparatus will continue to keep turning more enemy agents into sources and recruits. This will lead to a continual cycle of intelligence

collection. A select few highly capable undercover agents will also be inserted into the enemy organization in order to subvert the insurgents from within.(24)

Torture. The terrorist threat may necessitate direct intervention by the military and extreme extra-judicial measures. He should have no attorney present during questioning. It is necessary to obtain information quickly and efficiently from a detainee using skilled interrogators who are intimately familiar with the terror network. Information sought from the individual should not pertain to his culpability in terrorist acts for which he could be criminally prosecuted, but rather to the network itself. This would provide information about new targets. If the prisoner is not cooperative, specialists would then force him to reveal his information. Care should be taken not to physically injure the individual. Once questioning was completed, the subject should then be regarded as a prisoner of war and, as such, be treated in accordance with international law. Trinquier rationalizes the use of extreme measures by arguing that is much better to target the individual terrorist, than to bomb a village by artillery or by air which could produce collateral casualties such as women and children.(25)

Decisive Factor – Resources. Fighting the insurgent requires the government to utilize its superior resources properly. The fight is not one of junior officers at the tactical level; but is one of vast areas, political and military actions to be taken across the broad population, and cooperative and coordinated efforts between the military and many different braches of the civil government. It must be understood that success requires time and intensive preparation and direction.(26)

Urban Counterinsurgency

Police Actions. Trinquier discusses "The Political and Military Conduct of the War." With regard to the political aspect, actions directed against the insurgents within the cities will be police operations. The goal must be to root out and eliminate the enemy which has enmeshed itself with the populous not simply to arrest several suspects.(27)

Army Dragnet. Simultaneously, the army can throw a net over the entire city. Light units can respond rapidly to emergent situations. The military and the police will then cooperate in the intelligence effort directed at identifying the enemy organization.(28)

Mass Interviews. People will only provide the names of the enemy operatives if they feel that the environment is safe enough to do so. Large scale interviews must be conducted individually and in secret. This protects informants' identities. Then, the first echelon of the enemy organization can be identified and arrested. The denounced individuals can then be turned in order to gain more names of enemy operatives that ascend the chain of command.(29)

Problems with Urban Operations. These large scale urban police operations lead to numerous difficulties such as the need to lodge detained persons. Prison camps should be established in advance which meet the conditions set forth under the Geneva Convention.(30) Second, terrorists will seek the protection of due process which will slow or even prevent operations. The press, the insurgents, and many domestic and international organizations will loudly demand legal protections for the terrorists. Third, police operations due not occur on a remote battlefield but in full view of the public. Necessary force may be viewed as brutality. This requires rigorous discipline on the part

of the security forces. The government must not allow itself to be manipulated into turning against its security forces.(31)

Propaganda. The people must understand the goals of the government and must not be lied to. This will make the populous more likely to support the counterinsurgency effort. While the insurgents are still operating among the populous, the population will not be able to speak or act freely. Until security is established, government propaganda efforts will be ineffective except to inform the populous as to the necessity of severe measures.(32)

Social Services. During the period of security operations, social service agencies should administer aid providently in order to lessen the suffering of the populous. When security has been established, even in a small area, humanitarian assistance should be plentiful but should be administered in a manner which will both reward supporters of the government and sway others to the cause of the government.(33)

Use of the Army. There are many arguments that law enforcement agencies are the only entities suited for police and para-military operations which take place among the populous and that the military should be reserved for use on the open field of battle. The problem with this idea is that the police are trained, equipped, and staffed to be able to apprehend common criminals. The insurgent has as his goal to "conquer the nation and to overthrow its regime." Thus, dealing with this threat is clearly the responsibility of the military.(34)

Rural Counterinsurgency

Security Situation. With regard to the military conduct of war, the insurgents will focus on the use of terrorism in the cities while guerilla warfare, with terrorist roots, will

be the focus in rural areas. At the very first of the insurgent struggle, the insurgents will attempt to create a situation where security is lost and the government is forced to give up control of certain areas and to bunker down in more defensible positions.(35)

Futile Methods. Many counter-insurgency methods yield little real results. Outposts protecting high ground, intersections, etc. do little to affect those insurgents who move freely about the population. Patrols and even specially trained commandos move through particular areas, but the insurgents simply avoid them or set ambushes. Ambushes by the government forces are seldom secret and can be counterproductive. Large scale sweeps do not catch insurgents off guard and are never tight enough to contain fleeing enemies. "Only a long occupation of the countryside, which will permit police operations among the people analogous to those carried out in the cities, can succeed."(36)

Statistics. Commanders must not get caught up in the seduction of statistics. An operation where the number of insurgents killed and weapons captured does not indicate a victory. The enemy's potential for warfare has not been addressed.(37)

Identify Weak-Points. Modern warfare has come to demonstrate the inevitability of an ill-equipped and relatively untrained force overcoming a well equipped and professional force. The manner in which the counterinsurgents utilize their resources must therefore be addressed. The weak-points of the insurgents must be identified and then concentrated upon.(38)

Terrain. The guerrilla's greatest advantage is intimate knowledge of the terrain and support from the population where he operates. This is also his weakness. If he is forced to operate outside of the location where he is best adapted, the terrain and

population may become his adversary. The guerilla should be forced to vacate his comfort zone by long-term government occupation of the area through several methods: by the interruption of the guerrilla's supply train, particularly food, by eliminating his hold upon the population, particularly through the destruction of the insurgent's organization, and by the enabling the populous to protect itself. "To recapitulate our rapid analysis, we have three simple principles to apply in fighting the guerrilla – to cut the guerrilla off from the population that sustains him; to render guerrilla zones untenable; and to coordinate these actions over a wide area and for long enough, so that these steps will yield the desired results."(39)

Destruction of the Organization. Regarding counterguerrilla operations, the entire enemy organization must be destroyed. It must be understood that the insurgents operate within the population as a part of a broad organization. The same leadership structure exists in the rural areas as in the urban areas. There are additions to the support structure such as logistics and health services.(40)

Insurgent Operational Areas. Insurgent bands will remain in the sector where they are most comfortable. This area is then divided into three groups. The towns or population centers will serve as targets for urban terrorism and locations from which to gather intelligence on the government forces. The inhabited rural area is provides the insurgents with food, shelter, and intelligence. The population of this area is firmly under insurgent control. The third area is the refuge area which serves as the safe area for the insurgents. Refuges are isolated and located where government access can be easily cut off by the destruction of bridges, roads, etc.(41)

Sector Level Operations. While the area that is most vulnerable to the insurgent is the town, the primary objective should be the destruction of the insurgent politico-military apparatus in inhabited rural areas. In order to achieve this, a grid representing military areas of responsibility must correspond to the civil administrative areas, even if this is not tactically logical. The initial grid will then be staffed by sector troops. These troops will then occupy and defend a village making it a strategic hamlet. A police operation will then be conducted throughout the hamlet. A census of both people and animals will be taken.(42)

Self-Defense Force. A self-defense force will be established in order to free up some of the occupying troops. This force, known as interval troops, will reinforce the sector reserve. The interval unit will be battalion in size with the mission "to destroy the politico-military organization in the intermediate area; to destroy the armed bands that attempt to oppose this action, to bring in people to the strategic hamlets and, if possible, to create new hamlets for regrouping and control of every inhabitant of the intermediate area."(43)

Police Operations. If, during counterinsurgency operations in a village, the enemy escapes to the refuge area, a police operation will commence in the village. Part of the unit will search for weapons and other enemy materiel. The other part of the unit confidentially and individually questions the entire population. They will be asked basic questions of which they will be able to answer such as who collects taxes and who conducts surveillance in the village for the enemy. Once this first level of enemy operatives is detained, interrogations and detentions will then move up the chain of the

organization. This process also helps identify future members of the indigenous

counterinsurgency intelligence apparatus.(44)

Control of the Populous. At this point, a methodical organization and control of

the populous will be established. The population will be carefully monitored in

comparison with the census in order to spot newcomers or individuals who are missing.

Police operations will continue in order to make the village inhospitable to the insurgents.

As necessary troops and equipment become available, more strategic hamlets will be

created. This must all be applied methodically in order to steadily deny the insurgents

support.(45)

Zone Level. Regarding zone level operations, decisive action by the lower sector

commanders is first necessary. At this point, the insurgent organization can be targeted

on a larger scale. Across the zone, it is necessary that all procedures and methods are

uniformed. This aspect is critical in the pursuit of the enemy. Units should closely

coordinate with each other in order to allow the pursuit of insurgents into adjacent areas

of operation.(46)

Command Awareness. The commanding general must frequently make personal

inspections of pacification efforts in order to confirm that these are on track and have not

been corrupted. "Such projects include construction of new rods, or the repair of those

that have been sabotaged; construction of new strategic hamlets to receive people falling

back from the danger areas; school construction, and economic development of the

department to give displaced persons means of subsistence. (47)

Offensive Operations. During offensive operations, information gained should be

immediately exploited. The population should be evacuated from the operational areas

and taken to a designated camp. Ambushes should then be laid out. Psychological actions will then encourage the weaker enemy to surrender. Methodical searches must be made for enemy food stuffs, weapons, safe houses, etc. Much of this can be redistributed to the appropriate civilians. It is advised that "organization and control of the population, and supplementary controls over food, circulation of persons and goods, animals, etc., as well as a flawless intelligence service, must remain in force until peace has been restored to the entire national territory."(48)

COIN Levels of Organization. Intelligence must be thoroughly developed regarding the enemy before operations commence. At the lowest level, grid units will occupy areas such as towns and sensitive sites. They will see the most activity. These units must be trained in police operations. As conditions stabilize, they will be gradually replaced by civilian law enforcement. Interval units should consist of well trained tactical troops who will range the sector, destroying enemy politico-military operatives in the inhabited rural area and moving civilians into protected areas. Intervention troops are the highly trained elite combat troops who pursue, search, and destroy the enemy in the refuge areas.(49)

Insurgent Safe Havens

Border Crossings. Trinquier examines how to turn the tables and take the fight to the enemy. Insurgents will seek to utilize other countries as safe havens especially for basing. As long as this condition exists, internal stability will always be at risk. Diplomacy may be used to encourage those countries to forbid insurgent basing, training, staging, and other operations within their borders. Cross border operations by counterinsurgent forces have become increasingly difficult politically.(50)

Futile Countermeasures. Border control measures such as barriers can be emplaced, although barriers can easily be watched by the enemy in order to spot weaknesses. Air attacks are also undesirable because they can easily be manipulated and distorted to the enemy's propaganda advantage. These traditional methods of combating the enemy across an international border are counterproductive to the overall strategy.(51)

Taking COIN to the Enemy. Modern warfare then should be taken to the enemy. Indigenous forces in the country which hosts the enemy must therefore be raised. A cadre should be recruited and developed. Personal gain, ambition, racial tension, social problems, and other factors of that country can be used as the tool for recruiting.(52) This must be done in absolute secrecy. Many fighters will also come from the ranks of the turned enemy. This force will also be given a political flavor which will further conceal the true benefactor. These forces will strike at the enemy from within the neutral country.(53)

DAVID GALULA ON COUNTERINSURGENCY
Galula

Background. David Galula (1919-1967) was a class of 1940 graduate of Saint-Cyr, France's West Point. In World War Two, he fought against the Axis in North Africa, France, and Germany. He also participated in the occupation of Germany. From 1945-1948, he observed the communist takeover in China firsthand from his post at the French Embassy in Beijing. In Algeria, Galula's "field experience was confined to two military sectors of Kabylia, the rugged, densely populated mountain region east of

Algiers. From August 1956 until April 1958, the then Captain Galula commanded the 3d Company of the 45th Colonial Infantry Battalion in the Tigriz sector; in the four months following his promotion to major, he served as deputy battalion commander in Borj Menaiel.(54) He wrote of his experiences in Pacification in Algeria, 1956-1958.

David Galula was a line infantry officer who had experience working in the diplomatic arena. His approach to counterinsurgency was more personalized. He believed that each small unit commander could individually win his local portion of the counterinsurgency effort which could add up into a national victory

Character of War in Algeria

Multidisciplinary Approach. Galula believes that the interagency or holistic effort is necessary but that the military will be responsible for the physical implementation of political plans due to the fact that they are the only ones with enough boots on the ground to accomplish the mission. It is critical that the civilian and military agencies operate under one doctrine and their efforts be coordinated from the beginning.(55)

Situational Recognition. "The delay in appreciating the situation and the true extent of the threat resulted in an insufficient answer to the challenge, and the fire ignited in the rugged Aures Mountain easily survived the first French reaction. The rebellion had thus passed its first test, perhaps the most critical one, and its spreading became inevitable."(56)

Terrorism. In the case of Algeria, the terrorism of the population by the insurgents was so extreme that there existed a hostile minority that was very active. The majority consisted of those who were basically neutral to hostile to the government, but not active. "Under those conditions the pro minority will emerge only once it has been

assured of the firmness of our intentions and once the con minority has been, if not destroyed, at least paralyzed."(57)

Insurgent Recruitment. The first stage of terrorism in Algeria was one of "blind terrorism" that involved violent acts designed to spread general fear and attract publicity. After this brief stage, "selective terrorism" took hold. Its objectives included killing Muslims working for the French government or suspected of being sympathetic with the French, driving a wedge of distrust between Christians and Muslims, forcing Muslims to participate in terrorist activities in order to bring about a heavy-handed government response, bringing all Muslims into the fight through insurgent taxation and other means, and organizing local insurgent committees.(58)

Countering the Insurgency

General Counterinsurgency

Viewpoint. Galula offers a more nuts and bolts approach to counterinsurgency. His vantage point was that of a company grade officer in the field.

Propaganda. During the initial phases of operations, the population's access to propaganda is much more important that the population's responsiveness to it. The pro minority, although hidden at this point, will most likely be those who have learned the language and culture of the counterinsurgent forces – which in the case of Algeria was French.(59)

Objective – Population. Galula postulated "that support from the population was the key to the whole problem for us as well as for the rebels. By 'support' I mean not merely sympathy or idle approval but active participation in the struggle."(60) The first step in the contest of wills, the goals of the counterinsurgents must be enunciated. In the

case of Algeria, the government desired victory; specifically, to keep Algeria is part of France.(61)

In order for success to be achieved by the counterinsurgents, whatever form that success may take, they must mobilize the supportive minority of indigenous persons. This pro minority will then be responsible for turning the neutral majority in support for the counterinsurgents and against the hostile minority. Only after this hostile minority has been eliminated can the desired political formula be put into place.(62)

Torture. Galula, from his more tactical vantage point, noted that a suspected insurgent was unwilling to admit his involvement in anti-government activities. When a sergeant placed the subject in a brick oven and then threatened to fire it up, the individual gave up the information he held. The nature of dealing with vicious terrorists leads soldiers into the undesirable task of police work. Galula's "concerns were: (1) that it be kept within decent limits, and (2) that it not produce irreparable damage to my more constructive pacification work....As for moral twinges, I confess I felt no more guilty than the pilot who bombs a town knowing the existence of, but not seeking, the women and children below."(63)

Consistency. A serious impediment facing the counterinsurgency forces was a lack of consistency in various aspects of operations. There was no real counterinsurgency doctrine. The insurgents could only be defeated through the application of a concerted and consistent effort. If a commander did not believe in pacification, he simply would not attempt it.(64)

Candor. Another necessary constant was the truth. In order to win people over to the side of the government, the counterinsurgents had to win the trust of the population by consistently telling the truth.(65)

Propaganda. Another element which required consistency was propaganda. The successes which were achieved by the government were never exploited in their own propaganda. Also, counterinsurgent forces needed to be familiar with the accepted lines of propaganda. Units which came up with their own propaganda themes might jeopardize adjacent units or the overall government mission.(66)

Codified Punishments. It was critical to develop a consistent code which would detail the specific offenses and punishments for which the population would be held accountable. In Algeria, punishments varied greatly depending on which unit controlled which area.(67)

Firmness. Galula discusses how transgressions committed by the enemy must be dealt with firmly. Unless the insurgents are punished severely, the insurgents will have no fear of being held accountable for their actions and the populous will never have an impetus for committing themselves to the government. The judicial system must be adapted to deal with the realities of the situation. If not, extra-judicial activities will lead to an undermining of the legitimacy of the government and to the destruction of troop morale due to their participation or accused participation in these illegal activities.(68)

Decisive Factor – Small Unit Leader. His specific plans with specific steps for the villages were rooted in his belief and experience that the company was the instrument which could win the counterinsurgency. The companies were close enough to the people to tailor their efforts to the specific area. The company commander could call upon

higher headquarters for both manpower and materiel when necessary while he could shift his platoons throughout high area of operations both pacify and occupy selected areas.(69)

Rural Counterinsurgency

"This result can be achieved by a series of well-defined political-military operations, the implementation of which is within the reach of the executants, each operation being a step toward victory. Here is the general scheme:

(a) in a selected area, concentrate enough means to destroy or expel the large rebel bands.

(b) leave in the area enough troops to prevent a return of the large rebel bands.

(c) establish these remaining units in the main localities.

(d) establish contact with and control of the population.

(e) destroy the rebels' political cells.

(f) set up locally elected provisional authorities.

(g) test them by imposing tasks which will compromise them seriously in the eyes of the rebels while linking them with us through substantial moral and material advantages. Create, in particular, self-defense units.

(h) discard the "soft," and keep the "activists" who have emerged.

(i) group and train the activists in a new political party.

(j) while controlling them, give them all our moral and material support so as to enable them to win over to the common cause of the neutral majority.

(k) with the pro minority plus the neutral majority, eliminate the irreducible enemies while striving to win over the ordinary followers.

(l) order having been restored in the selected area, repeat the scheme elsewhere. (It is not necessary for point (k) to have been achieved before starting in a new area.)"(70)

Positive Side-Effects. The implementation of this program in one area will support counterinsurgents in other areas by denying the rebels the program area as a refuge and base of support while the enemy is conducting operations in other areas. Also, a pacified area will allow government forces to then move a lot of its forces in the area to the next targeted area. This is what is termed the oil slick. This careful step by step method is easy to comprehend and to follow. Once insurgent cells in an area have been destroyed, it will be difficult for them to rebuild.(71)

Interagency Cooperation. Military and civilian government agencies should operate from a single doctrine. The military and the civil administration should coordinate with each other throughout operations. In the aforementioned plan points 'a' through 'c' above should be military operations. The eventual goal of point 'd' above would be for the civil authorities to take control and responsibility, but it must be understood that the only apparatus which has the manpower to implement the political aspects of the plan, points 'd' through 'l', is the military. During this process, the civil administration possesses the required material means. This requires a highly cooperative atmosphere.(72)

Unit Adaptation. Units must be ready to adapt to the evolving situation. They must not be restricted to their traditional sizes and compositions. As the effort shifts more toward point 'd', part of the unit will orient itself more toward the political role. At the same time, the other part of the unit will orient itself more toward being a tracking

and striking force which will both clean up enemy remnants in the area and prevent the return of enemy forces. The units who assume a more politically oriented role will be more lightly armed which will help orient them toward police and intelligence operations such as "controlling movements, census-taking, collecting intelligence, conducting propaganda, giving medical care, teaching, taking care of youth organizations, and providing economic aid."(73)

Some unit adaptations include having an executive officer at the company level who should handle all day to day routine tasks thereby permitting the company commander to concentrate on pacification efforts. The battalion should have a commando unit able to conduct immediate raids and arrests in the area. The battalion must, however, enlarge its medical, intelligence, and other pertinent capabilities in order to better support the pacification effort. At the regiment, larger resources would be required to provide this specialized support.(74)

Targeting – Population Density. With regard to selecting the targeted areas from which to begin a counterinsurgency campaign, population density must be considered. Populations of the greatest density will have the most importance in the effort. Economics then plays into the equation. The trading economies of the towns lend themselves to counterinsurgents while more isolated and backwards the economies are less favorable to pacification efforts. Towns, preferably several ones separated by deserts, provide greater opportunities for government forces to secure footholds.(75)

Indigenous Support. Counterinsurgent forces should seek to exploit divisions with societies. Village elders may be reasoned with to help restore order and stop insurgents while, conversely, youths may be convinced that the government will bring

about modernization and other advancements. Women may be a good resource for intelligence. Any religious, ethnic, social or other difference should be exploited. Antagonism(76)

CONTEMPORARY APPLICATION

It is important never to view programs which were successful in one conflict as a template for future successes. It is equally important not to summarily disregard from consideration sound programs and methods which were not successful in one arena. Every country, every people, and every war is different. There are thousands of individual influences which act upon each individual conflict such as culture, history, personalities, resources, demography, and geography. What follows is a personal examination of the ideas expressed by Trinqquier and Galula and their relevance to modern conflicts.

1. Multidisciplinary Approach. Both Trinquier and Galula addressed the issue of a multidimensional approach to war. Trinquier warned of the enemy's use of this strategy while Galula felt that only the military had the sufficient manpower to implement it. In today's world, the enemy is increasingly using all of its assets and the assets of other to its advantage in the fight against the United States. An example of this is the effective use of the international news media. It is important for the United States to also use such a holistic approach wholeheartedly. The instruments of national power are today termed diplomatic strategies, informational strategies, military strategies, and economic strategies (DIME).(77) It is critical that each element be viewed as necessary and complimentary and not as optional and competitive. Only through effective

interagency cooperation can all the instruments of national power be successfully utilized so that American policies can be successful.

2. Situational Recognition. There are frequent cautions against overstating the position of insurgents thus glamorizing or legitimizing them. An Arab proverb was related to me which states that one should not make one's enemy larger than he really is. This approach is evident in recent references to terrorists within Great Britain as criminal thugs. This is a very wise caveat, but, as Trinquier pointed out, when governments are unwilling to recognize large scale violent actions as being part of a larger organization, the authorities are then caught off guard when they acknowledged the reality of the situation only when it is too late.

3. Terrorism. As Trinquier observed, terrorist tactics seeks to separate the government from the citizenry. Police are forced into a paramilitary role and have to utilize armored vehicles, high levels of personal ballistic protection, and fortress-like police stations in order to stay alive. As this bunker mentality grows, the government increasingly blames the population for not giving information about insurgent activities and for giving aid and comfort to the enemy. It is critical for the security forces not to play into the hands of the insurgents.

Many counterinsurgency methods may on their face appear counterintuitive. In this age of high technology weapons, advanced body armor, and wars where western countries have demanded low friendly casualty rates, it may appear that in order to be protected, soldiers may be insulated from both the enemy and from the population. By doing this, soldiers are further distanced from already foreign populations. This may leave only the insurgents with complete contact with an indigenous population, thus they

can garner support from as well as dispense rewards and punishments to the locals. Also, the insurgents are emboldened to conduct increased violent activity because the security forces are trapped within their own methods of self-protection.

Following the Dayton Peace Accords, I served in former Yugoslavia as a military advisor helping to reestablish police services. Bosnia-Herzegovina was divided into three zones, American, French, and British. The Americans operated under the directive that there were to be no casualties. All troops traveled in convoys with full armaments. A meeting with local officials took on more the appearance of a presidential motorcade than a one-on-one open and honest interaction.

The British and French took a radically different approach. They patrolled on foot with soft headgear and light armaments. They would have tea with villagers and interact with them in a low key manner. They would simply pop in on local officials to have a friendly low key chat. It was repeatedly stressed by our international partners that if the situation were an insurgency, the American show of force would be quite counterproductive.

In order to gain the support of the populous, to collect effective human intelligence, to reduce casualties, and to ultimately win the war, counterinsurgency forces must place themselves in harm's way, which means in direct contact with the population. This allows both the security forces and the populace to see each other as human beings. During a meeting with a local Afghan judge who was known to be in danger due to his efforts to fight public corruption, the judge related to me that, although people may not say it because of their being in danger and the press might not report it, a lot of the

Afghan people remember that it was the United States that stood up to communism world wide and helped free the Afghan people from Soviet occupation.

4. Legal System. Trinquier observed that the legal system at work in Algeria was reactive and manipulated by the insurgents. Galula warned that the legal system must adapt or face an undermining of morale and legitimacy. The legal system must be able to adapt to emerging threats or it will be unable to protect a country's citizenry. This includes protection from both the insurgents and from those vigilantes who act out of frustration, fear, or personal motives. In the United States, exigent circumstances are recognized by the courts. Also, the constitution, as a living document, has allowed the legal system to adapt to reality for over two hundred years rather than to remain an academic forum. To make the argument that a legal system should not be allowed to meet emerging challenges is as logical as to make the argument that emerging challenges negate the framework of the legal system.

Objective. There can be no argument that the objective in a counterinsurgency is the population which both Trinquier and Galula agreed upon. Counterinsurgency forces must be careful not to lose the trust of the indigenous population once it is gained. It has been my observation that follow-through is the key ingredient of support of the populous. There must be consistency from unit to unit not only across a theater but in succeeding tours of duty. Many times, promises are made in order to resolve immediate problems where those promises cannot be kept. Governments must be careful not to be manipulated by different sides.

When United Nations personnel declare Srebrenica, Bosnia-Herzegovina a safe zone, Muslim refugees poured in. This was very convenient for the Serbian forces.

Regular military units sealed off the town while paramilitary units massacred thousands of refugees. No one remembers how an angry mob surrounded and practically forced the UN leadership in Bosnia to declare Srebrenica a safe haven while everyone remembers how the UN troops stood by helplessly as the refugees begged them for help as they were being massacred. This one incident did great harm to the perceived legitimacy of the UN. A common theme related to me by Muslim citizens and government officials alike in Bosnia was that they knew in their hearts that no American military personnel would ever stand by while such a war crime was committed.

Torture. In an insurgency, where the smallest tactical actions can resonate with strategic consequences, a tactical victory may lead to strategic defeat while the smallest gesture can evoke support and loyalty. Both authors rationalize the use of torture which in fact directly led to tactical victories such as the winning of the Battle of Algiers. The problem with this is that France lost its moral authority and played right into the hands of the insurgents on the world stage. This harmed France's international image, eroded domestic political support, and led to a lack of credibility.

In a counterinsurgency, it is imperative that all those involved, from the head of government to the private in the military, understand both the mission and the long term ramifications of every action taken. The incidents which occurred at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq greatly damaged the image of the United States worldwide and played right into the hands of the insurgents. What happened was relatively insignificant in comparison with the tactics used by the enemy such as beheading prisoners on camera while they screamed for help and using unwitting mentally retarded persons strapped with explosives to blow up pet markets filled with women and children. The difference is

that the United States stands as the unwavering force against evil. Its legitimacy and popular support comes from its virtue.

A continuing source of problems related to Abu Ghraib is the suspicion by others internationally that there must be more and much greater abuses which have been covered up by the United States Government. This is because people are accustomed to the idea that governments first lie and second destroy evidence in order to protect their own interests. They do not understand that a country such as the United States would be so appalled as to the transgressions of its own personnel that it would move with speed and transparency to uncover abuses and to prevent further misdeeds.

Resources. Roger Trinquier came from the background of an airborne officer and was oriented toward a more kinetic approach to warfare. His emphasis in winning a counterinsurgency is the effective use of all national resources. Will using superior firepower, mobility, training, speed, and other resources be able to defeat an unconventional threat or does it require the non-sterile low technology person to person approach? These points of view are still hotly contested today.

A military may be very successful at pursuing and neutralizing very small and low technology insurgent elements, but at what cost? Can a nation withstand the impact to its economy and morale by continuing to deploy and utilize resources such as large amounts of manpower and high technology. The cost of recruiting, training, fielding, supplying, equipping, and replenishing large numbers of highly trained and equipped forces can go on and on. The price of high technology weapons systems, surveillance platforms, and other materiel can go out of control while the insurgents, incurring the cost of a few items obtained at the local market which are then used to make improvised

devices, can bleed the economy of the counterinsurgent forces dry. The counterinsurgent forces may be able to eventually track down and destroy insurgent elements, but can they (and even more importantly their public's at home) maintain a perpetual state of operations?

Resources, especially technology, can be perceived as a panacea where one can do everything with relatively little risk to one's own forces. This over-reliance on technology can lead to laziness, a loss of tactical capabilities, and a loss of critical skills. An example of this is the idea which has emerged more than once in the Unites States, most notably in the late 1970s, that human intelligence can be more effectively substituted with technical means. The end result was that the country was deficient in this critical area which takes many years to develop and establish.

Indigenous Intelligence. Trinquier detailed intricate steps for the development of an indigenous intelligence network while Galula discussed how a small unit could collect intelligence from the populace with whom security forces are in contact. Development of an indigenous intelligence network is both essential but care must be taken that actions legitimize the security forces. This apparatus by its very nature must operate in secret but must be governed by strict internal controls and accountability to prevent abuses. It is possible for the populous to develop a trust in these forces to the point that people are willing to provide timely and accurate information. The citizenry must have the ability to report insurgent activity, and the security forces must have the ability to verify this information.

In developing this apparatus, the situation must be viewed through the eyes of the indigenous population. A police official in a desolate Afghan village related to me that if

he were to arrest an insurgent, it was expected that later in the week the police official's house would be burned to the ground – with him in it.

Providing the opportunity to report includes not only the physical ability such as an anonymous telephone line which can provide the prime opportunity for abuses and red herrings but also the appropriate setting and trust. While on patrol as a uniformed law enforcement officer in the United States, I would routinely park my car and get out on foot patrol in the area's more violent neighborhoods. This allowed me to get to know the geography and also the residents. They were also able to talk with me in a low key fashion with relative anonymity because I would engage everyone with whom I came in contact in conversation, whether they desired to talk with law enforcement or not. Perhaps most important, this conveyed the message to the criminals and the honest citizenry that law enforcement would not be intimidated and that these officers took a genuine interest in the safety of the populous.

One night I responded to a homicide scene. I was the patrol shift supervisor that evening. There was a large crowd of several hundred people present at the club where the shooting had occurred. Due to the fact that I was driving by the scene as the radio call went out, I was relatively sure that all of these individuals had been present at the time which the crime was committed. After numerous interviews with bystanders, everyone reported that had not seen anything.

Later in the evening, a lady and her son approached me as I was on patrol and asked to speak with me. She stated that she had been present at the time of the shooting and then identified the shooter. I then asked her why she had not said anything earlier. She then related the fact that because I had a clipboard and that officers were reporting to

me, it was evident that I was some sort of supervisor. The shooter, unbeknownst to me, had been standing behind me the entire time that I was at the incident scene. He was both waiting to see if anyone provided any information regarding the crime and to convey a message to the crowd. Without knowing the total picture, this could have led to the misperception by law enforcement that the citizenry did not care enough to come forward when a member of their own community was killed. It could have also led to the misperception by detractors of law enforcement that the relationship between the police and the populace was so poor that no one was willing to come forward.

CONCLUSION

The Algerian War took was fought from 1954 to 1962, but it still holds many valuable lessons which are applicable to today's conflicts. Trinquier and Galula offer invaluable insight into both nationwide and local counterinsurgency efforts. Both individuals understood that the key to winning a counterinsurgency is the populous.

The use of a nation's resources must be used to their highest degree of effectiveness while using all available tools in the arsenal – diplomatic, informational, military, and economic. Only through this holistic approach can an insurgency be adequately addressed. The resources of a country must be properly and effectively brought to bear in a well thought out and methodical process in order to conduct a successful counterinsurgency.

It must be cautioned that the resources of a nation cannot substitute for the individual and personalized efforts which are necessary to win at counterinsurgency. A

country's greatest asset in this form of warfare is the effective small unit leader whose tactical operations have strategic ramifications.

Notes

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